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Abstract
This paper explores whether trust, developed in one context, transfers into another,
distinct context and, if so, attempts to quantify the influence this prior trust exerts.
Specifically, we investigate the effects of artificially stimulated prior trust as it transfers
across disparate contexts and whether this prior trust can compensate for negative
objective information. To study such incidents, we leveraged Berg’s investment game
to stimulate varying degrees of trust between a human and a set of automated agents.
We then observed how trust in these agents transferred to a new game by observing
teammate selection in a modified, four-player extension of the well-known board
game, Battleship. Following this initial experiment, we included new information
regarding agent proficiency in the Battleship game during teammate selection to see
how prior trust and new objective information interact. Deploying these experiments
on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk platform further allowed us to study these phenomena
across a broad range of participants. Our results demonstrate trust does transfer across
disparate contexts and this inter-contextual trust transfer exerts a stronger influence
over human behavior than objective performance data. That is, humans show a strong
tendency to select teammates based on their prior experiences with each teammate,
and proficiency information in the new context seems to matter only when the
differences in prior trust between potential teammates are small.
Keywords: Trust transfer; Trust contexts; Trusting behavior; Investment game
Introduction
The trust one person has in another varies depending on context [1, 2]. You may trust
someone to water your plants while you are away but not trust that person to babysit
your children. This contextualization of trust makes sense; by definition, trust requires
the truster to make herself vulnerable, taking a risk based on her belief that the trustee
will act in her best interest. If the truster has good information about the trustee’s plant
tending skills, she may be willing to risk her greenery, but a green thumb does not imply
childcare skills, so risking her children’s safety does not follow.
Regardless of these differences, we often rely on trust “transferring” from one context to
another. If our truster has a reliable co-worker, she may ask the co-worker to tend to her
plants without any information about the trustee’s horticultural skills. This transfer seems
to occur despite contextual distinction because the truster’s prior experience with the
trustee’s reliability increases her belief the trustee will behave appropriately even though
she has no information about past performance in the new context. These apparent con-
tradictions between observations of high trusting behavior and expectations of low trust
are consistent with a plethora of prior research on the paradoxes of initial trust [3–6].
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While the body of work on trust, how it evolves, dissolves, is stimulated, and how it
can be transferred from entity to entity is relatively large, trust as it transfers between
contexts has received little attention. Despite this lack of attention, however, inter-
contextual trust seems to have noticeable effects on trust decisions. Indeed, we often
see contextual trust transfer exploited in exercises designed to enhance trust between
colleagues. Consider the trust fall or other team building exercises popular in cor-
porate environments. These exercises are designed to build interpersonal trust that
will then transfer to the workplace, even when the context of the exercise is largely
unrelated.
Trust transfer is defined as “when a [truster] bases initial trust in [a trustee] on trust
in some other related entity, or on a context other than the one in which the [trustee]
is encountered,” and it is the latter half of this definition on which we concentrate [7].
Specifically, we are interested in how strongly trust transfers between largely unrelated
contexts and how important that trust is in the face of other objective information. To test
these concepts, we constructed a two-phase experiment and ran it with human partici-
pants recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk platform. Each participant played Berg’s
investment game, a standard construct often used to establish and test trust, against three
other “players” controlled by agents programmed to stimulate varying degrees of trust [6].
Participants were then asked to pick one of the three agents from the previous game as a
teammate for a partner-based cooperative game based onMilton Bradley’s Battleship that
included the possibility of betrayal. We found that not only did participants choose the
most trustworthy agent as their teammate the vast majority of the time, but they chose
the trustworthy agent even when objective information about its skill at the Battleship
game indicated the agent was less qualified (sometimes significantly so) than other
possible choices.
We believe these experiments are an interesting empirical analysis of trust transfer
across contexts and support quantifying the strength of prior trust compared to objective
information.
Background and related work
The idea that a person’s trust in another person or the social structures in which
they interact influences behavior and performance is not new. As early as the 1920s,
Edward Thorndike referred to a cognitive bias in which one’s initial impressions of
another’s character exerts significant influence over later subjective assessments of that
person as the “Halo Effect” [8]. Given the potential social benefits of such increased
trust, a significant subfield of research has grown around topics like techniques for
studying trust, stimulating trust in new relationships, repairing trust after betrayal, and
transferring trust from one entity to another [1, 3–5, 9]. Mechanisms for transferring
trust are of particular interest because they facilitate many daily interactions like shop-
ping at a new location of a known brand or visiting a restaurant recommended by a
friend. While trust transfer between contexts is not well understood, existing works
on trust transfer, discussed below, provide an essential foundation for our work. Simi-
larly, since trust can be both difficult and expensive to study in situ, researchers have
developed constructs for studying trust using controlled game environments, a tech-
nique we leverage, so we include a brief background on this game research below
as well.
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Studying trust with games
In the mid-nineties, Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe introduced a game construct to study
trust and reciprocity with a simple two-player investment game [6]. This investment game
has been a popular lens through which researchers have explored methods to support or
suppress trust between players. Berg brought together a number of undergraduate stu-
dents to play a double-blind, one-shot game in which players were randomly split into two
groups: one of investors and one of investees (Berg et al. used “trustors” and “trustees”).
All players were provided an initial sum of money for participation, and investors were
then instructed to choose some amount of this sum to send to, or “invest with,” the
investee. Investees received triple the investor’s investment and chose some portion of
this sum (or none at all) to return to the investor. Investors were said to trust the investees
if they invested any amount as there was no guarantee any amount would be returned,
and investees were said to reciprocate trust if the amount returned was greater than the
investor’s investment.
Game theoretic literature provides a solution to Berg’s game in the form of a sub-
game perfect equilibrium in which optimal play is to invest nothing and return noth-
ing. Berg’s results, however, showed a non-zero average investment and return, which
ran counter to the predicted equilibrium. From these results, Berg, Dickhaut, and
McCabe concluded that self-interest could not account for these deviations from the
expected subgame perfect actions. Instead, they theorized that some investee play-
ers returned larger paybacks because they were entrusted with larger investments;
that is, they reciprocated the trust placed in them by the investors. Since then, this
simple game construct has served as a proxy for evaluating trust and reciprocity, giv-
ing researchers a tool for quantifying how changes in information and behavior can
affect trust.
One important modification to Berg’s investment game has been the addition of mul-
tiple rounds of play. In 2004, Cochard et al. investigated this extension by comparing a
seven-round repeated game with Berg’s one-shot version [10]. From this work, Cochard
theorized investor behavior was consistent with a “reciprocity hypothesis” in which
investors would trust more and therefore invest more as investees reciprocated more.
Engle-Warnick and Slonim also investigated such multi-round modifications and deter-
mined that, in certain scenarios, investor trust and reciprocity could be maintained or
strengthened as rounds increased [11]. Additionally, they observed that investor trust
resets to the player’s default level (governed by an external propensity to trust) when
paired with a new partner.
We base our implementation of Berg’s investment game on these latter results and
use it as a mechanism to foster trust between parties. In this manner, we can leverage
the amount of reciprocity as a proxy for trust; that is, the more reciprocation in the
investment game, the higher the trust between the players.
Trust transfer
Trust transfer, or the transitivity of trust, has been studied in a variety of ways and
applied across many disparate environments, from team formation to e-commerce to
distributed computer systems. While Stewart’s definition allows trust to transfer from
an entity/context to a separate entity/context, most treatments concentrate only on
transferring trust to a new, separate, and distinct entity (generally in the same context) [7].
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Trust transfer from entity to entity is the more commonly studied occurrence and one
on which the majority of recommendation systems operate. Though not often explic-
itly identified, recommendation systems rely on the trust a user has in the recommender
(either a friend, or website) to transfer to the entity being recommended. This effect was
shown in Strub and Priest’s 1976 discussion on trust transfer as an “extension pattern”
for drug users to expand the social networks necessary to procure desired drugs using
a trust third party as a referer and mediator to new entities [12]. Stewart presents other
examples of trust transfer as well (see [7]). More recently, research into trust transfer has
migrated from psychology and sociology to computational fields as trust in distributed
networks, social networks, and e-commerce sites becomes increasingly important. The
role of trust transfer in these new areas is unclear, however, as seen in Christianson
and Harbison’s 1997 work on why trust transitivity is dangerous in security proto-
cols [13]. Golbeck’s 2005 work gives a brief overview on other treatments where trust
transfer occurs and propagates on the World Wide Web; she then goes on to describe an
algorithm, TidalTrust, for using trust transitivity to propagate trust values across social
networks for friends of friends and movie reviews [14]. Dong, Russello, and Dulay’s
2007 work investigated the constraints necessary for trust to transfer between actors
in such distributed, decentralized networks [15]. Their work presented a simple model
and set of logical formulae for formally describing trust transfer based on trust poli-
cies. Furthermore, in works by Stewart and by Levin and Cross, researchers studied how
weak ties enabled trust transfer between communities with specific interest in hyperlinks
among websites, which support a form of trust transfer from a trusted website to another
site [7, 16].
Regarding trust transfer from context to entity, McKnight, Cummings, and Chervany
investigated the mechanisms for initial trust formation in new relationships (i.e.,
relationships where the actors have no prior experience with each other). While their
work was not directly about trust transfer, they posited one’s context was an impor-
tant hidden factor in explaining unexpectedly high levels of initial trust because certain
“institutional cues that enable one person to trust another without firsthand knowledge”
could enforce social norms or positive behaviors [5]. Riegelsberger, Sasse, and McCarthy
expanded on contextual factors that incentivize trust by including temporal and social
properties along with aforementioned institutional cues in a new trust model [9]. Social
context influence includes factors like social norms and reputation, and temporal context
covers factors like length of interaction or whether the interaction will be repeated. These
contexts make intuitive sense: interactions with a potentially threatening individual likely
differ based on where those interactions occur (e.g., a crowded room versus a dark alley).
Likewise, less incentive exists to behave in a trustworthy manner if two entities will only
interact one time and then never meet again.
Inter-context trust transfer for the same entity seems to be both a relatively new and
rarely studied concept. Though cross-context transfer occurs regularly in our daily lives,
the main treatment of it as a research question seems to be the recent work on how
consumers transfer their trust in retailers’ brick-and-mortar stores to their online stores.
Stewart introduced this retailer cross-context trust in 1999 and followed it up in 2003 with
an experiment that showed users’ trust intentions and intentions to buy from an online
retailer were increased if the retailer’s site showed a picture of a building or physical retail
location [7]. Riegelsberger and Sasse demonstrated similar results in a 2001 study on cues
Buntain and Golbeck Journal of Trust Management  (2015) 2:6 Page 5 of 16
online retailers could employ to increase user trust in their sites: specifically, “Inexperi-
enced e-shoppers are likely to transfer trust: They will give on-line shopping a first try
with retail organizations they are familiar with” [17]. This cross-context trust transfer
has also evolved as web commerce has grown in popularity and complexity. In 2011, Lu
et al. published a paper on consumer trust transfer from web-based payment services
to mobile-based services in much the same manner consumers transferred trust from
brick-and-mortar stores to web sites [18].
While these investigations into the flow of user trust from physical buildings to Inter-
net locations to mobile services do not exactly mirror our experiments on trust across
game contexts, strong parallels exist that support our work. For example, in these related
works, the user’s objective to purchase an item or service is consistent, and the details
around how the purchase is made changes from physical to web to mobile contexts.
Similarly, in our implementations of both Berg’s investment game and the modified
Battleship game, the user’s objective of playing a game to accumulate money is consistent,
but the contextual details around how the games are played and the structural rules in
place to limit betrayal change. Furthermore, our work takes this exploration a step further
as we have no knowledge of any other investigation into the strength of cross-context
trust with respect to new objective information.
Methodology
Our goals in the experiments outlined in this paper were two-fold: 1) to confirm whether
artificially stimulated trust between players in one context would transfer to an unrelated
context; and 2) whether such experiential prior trust would offset or overcome quanti-
tative player information. To this end, we constructed a two-phase experiment in which
the first phase established varying degrees of trust between a human player and three
automated agents in Berg’s investment game. The second phase then asked the human
participant to select one of these three agents as a teammate to play in a separate, unre-
lated game. We grouped our experiments into two treatments based on the information
provided to the human participant at the beginning of the second phase of play. In the
first treatment, participants were shown data on the investment and return amounts from
the previous rounds. As mentioned, this investment and return data denotes the amount
of reciprocity in the game, which we use as a proxy for trust (i.e., higher investment and
returns implies higher reciprocity and higher degrees of trust).
In the second treatment, participants were provided with this reciprocity data in addi-
tion to information regarding the proficiencies of each agent. Proficiencies here took the
form of objective information on the percentage of prior second-phase games that par-
ticular agent had won. By varying the pairs of reciprocity and proficiency scores, we
could then determine how strong the influence of prior trust was in teammate selection.
Statistical analysis of these teammate choices would then hopefully inform us about the
effects of trust transfer across contexts.
Game constructs
The experiments described herein leverage two different game constructs: Berg’s invest-
ment game, and a customized, cooperative, two-versus-two version of Milton Bradley’s
Battleship. While our use of Berg’s game is fairly standard with an initial investor sum of
$10 and investment multiplier of three, the three agent strategies used were non-standard
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and were designed to elicit a specific response from the human player. This strategy set
consisted of the following:
• Greedy Agent Never return any investment (subgame perfect strategy)
• Benevolent Agent Always return slightly more than the investor invested
• Exploitive Agent Return slightly more than invested in first two rounds, then return
nothing
Since the goal in deploying these strategies is to stimulate varying degrees of trust
between the human participant and the agents, we ascribe an ordering to these agents
based on the strength of trust they should instill. Our definition of “trust” follows that
of Stewart: a trustworthy agent’s behavior should be “benevolent, competent, honest,
predictable in a situation” [7]. Therefore, we expect the benevolent agent to be the most
trustworthy and exploitive agent to be the least trustworthy with the greedy agent falling
somewhere in between.
While our estimate of the exploitive agent’s trustworthiness may seem counterintuitive,
we refer to the Lewicki and Stevenson’s 1997 paper that presents a model of trust across
three different axes (calculus-based, knowledge-based, and identification-based trust).
Their definition of knowledge-based trust supports the greedy agent’s trustworthiness
being higher than the exploitive agent’s by virtue of predictability. Since the greedy
agent always behaves consistently, it is more predictable than the exploitive agent, and
“predictability enhances trust - even if the other is predictably untrustworthy - because
we can predict the ways that the other will violate the trust” [4].
Our modified, four-player Battleship game was slightly more complicated than our
implementation of Berg’s game. The original version of Milton Bradley’s Battleship is a
two-player game in which each player has a fixed number of ships of known sizes. Each
player places her ships on a private, hidden 10 × 10 board and tries to locate all her
opponent’s ships on a separate 10 × 10 tracking board. In our version, each player is given
two boats, each three consecutive squares long, that are placed on the her 5 × 5 board
randomly. Each player also is presented with three additional 5 × 5 tracking board, one
for each other player, so the player can track where her ships are, her teammate’s ships
are, and where she has searched for her opponents’ ships.
After placement, each player then selects a square from one of the four 5 × 5 boards
simultaneously and “shoots at” that square to see whether the opponent has a ship at that
location or not. The objective of the game is for a player and her teammate to find all their
opponents’ ships and “sink” them by shooting all squares of each opponent ship before
the opponents sinks her and her teammate’s ships. Figure 1 illustrates how these boards
look to the human participant.
Teams are divided into two sets of two players, and players on the same team can
see locations of each other’s boats. Critically, each player can shoot at any board
regardless of team affiliation (even her own). Also, rather than players’ taking turns
targeting opponent ships, in our versions, shots are taken simultaneously; that is,
all players select their targets at the same time, shots are revealed simultaneously,
and shot sources are kept hidden, so no player knows who shot at which target or
which board.
Play ends when all the boats on one team have been sunk, and winnings are divided
up among the surviving players on the winning team. This division of rewards provides
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The human participant's
Tracking Grid allows her 
to see where her ships are 
and where other players 
have shot at on her board.
A Missed Shot A Hit
One of the human participant's
Battleships
The human participant's
Tracking Grids for her 
opponents, so she can 
see where she has shot 
and hit or missed her 
opponents' ships.
A Hit on one of the 
opponent's ships
Target Reticule for where 
the human participant is 
about to shoot.
An Unexplored Square of 
the grid
The Tracking Grid for the  
human's Teammate
allows her to see her 
teammate's ships and 
shoot at them if she so 
desires.
Fig. 1 Human participant battleship interface
some incentive for betrayal if a player wants to kill her teammate and keep all winnings
for herself. The dynamics of this Battleship game are interesting in that players do not
necessarily know if/when their teammates have betrayed them and must therefore place
some level of trust in their teammates during play.
Experimental design
Our experiment was made available through a web interface in which participants were
presented with instructions on how the game would be played and a short quiz to ensure
appropriate understanding of the game. After reading the instructions and successfully
completing the quiz, the participant was randomly assigned to one of the game treatments
before starting the first phase of the experiment. In this first phase, the participant would
play five (5) consecutive rounds of Berg’s investment game with each of three automated
agents (participants were not aware they were playing automated opponents).
In each Phase 1 round, the participant was given a sum of $10 that she could keep
or invest with the current investee agent. After choosing the investment amount, that
amount was multiplied by the investment factor and sent to the agent to be processed
by its strategy. The participant was then shown how much the agent returned before
moving on to the next round where she would be provided with a new sum of $10 for
investment. At the end of each set of five rounds, the participant’s total investment, win-
nings, and remaining funds were calculated and stored. It is worth noting here that the
investee agents were color-coded such that, after five rounds of play with one agent, the
background color of the web page would change to make the transition to a new investee
more explicit to the participant. Background colors were chosen randomly to avoid any
color-related emotional bias.
Once the participant completed each set of games with the three agents, she was then
shown the instructions and rules for the battleship phase of the experiment. After read-
ing these rules, she was then provided with a tabular breakdown of her investments, her
winnings, investee returns, and investee winnings (see Fig. 2) and asked to select one of
these players as her partner for the next phase.
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Fig. 2 Display of player investments and winnings
Depending on the game treatment being played, the participant might also be shown
an additional column that lists each player’s “Battleship Win Record” (Fig. 3), which
represented the percentage of prior Battleship games won by that agent.
Since the choice of teammate in the second phase was the main point of interest, actual
play in the Battleship game was not monitored. The subject simply played with three
automated computer players who fired randomly.When the Battleship game ended, how-
ever, we did record whether the participant’s team won and whether the participant’s
teammate survived as this information was necessary for assigning end-of-game bonuses
(discussed below).
Fig. 3 Player investments and winnings with proficiency
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Game treatments
As mentioned, these experiments included two different treatments. In the first treat-
ment, human participants were not provided any information regarding agent profi-
ciencies in the Battleship game; that is, the only information provided was the data on
investments and returns. In the second treatment, each agent was assigned a win-rate
proficiency on a 0–100 scale, and that information was displayed to the participant prior
to teammate selection. This second treatment consisted of cases based on the relative dif-
ferences between these proficiency values. Assignments of agent strategy to proficiency
in this second treatment were random. The main motivation for the cases here was to
identify if a limit existed on how much of a difference in proficiency prior trust could
mitigate. These cases are shown in Table 1.
Participant selection
To obtain a large and diverse data set in a cost-effective manner, we leveraged Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk framework to recruit participants via the Internet. These players were
paid $0.95 for participating in the experiment and were given a bonus based on their per-
formances in both phases to incentivize good play. While first-phase rounds had clear
dollar amounts at stake, to provide a similar incentive for the Battleship game in the sec-
ond phase, participants were told the winning team would get $50 to be divided among
surviving team members. Bonuses were then calculated by taking the number of dollars
the participant had at the end of the first phase and adding the winnings from the Battle-
ship game (either $25 or $50 if the participant’s teammate did not survive) and paying a
penny for every dollar won.
To participate in the experiment, each human player accepted a Human Intelligence
Task (HIT) from the Mechanical Turk interface, which allowed us to enforce a number of
qualifications prior to play. First, players were only allowed to take part in the experiment
once; that is, after completing both game phases, participants were not allowed to play the
game again. Second, all players were required to have a high approval rating (greater than
96%) from other Mechanical Turk requesters in order to take part. Third, all players must
have completed more than 60 HITs in Mechanical Turk. Lastly, players were required to
be in the United States to minimize confounds from cultural differences.
Results
The following section demonstrates the effects of prior trust across our treatments and
684 unique human participants. All results are reported using a chi-squared test of inde-
pendence between the agent type and whether it was selected as the teammate for the
second phase. As our experiments for the second treatment were constructed such that
proficiency values were distributed equally among agent types, expected selection counts
were nearly uniform. In short, the results below show a significant relation between agent
Table 1 Treatment #2 per-case proficiency values
Case Proficiencies
1 [ 80, 85, 90]
2 [ 67, 80, 91]
3 [ 20 ± 7, 52, 85 ± 7]
4 [ 3 ± 2, 52, 85 ± 2]
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type and teammate selection regardless of proficiency information, or more plainly, par-
ticipants were much more likely to select the most trustworthy agent (the benevolent
agent) across all treatments.
Treatment #1: No proficiency information
For this first treatment, participants played the three sets of Berg’s investment game and
then selected their Battleship teammates based solely on prior experience. In total, we
collected data from 175 participants in Mechanical Turk. As expected, participants over-
whelmingly chose the trustworthy benevolent agent as the teammate when no additional
information is available. Data on this activity is shown in Table 2 with mean phase-one
winnings W̄1 and teammate selection counts C. If teammate selection was independent of
the trust established in the investment games, one would expect per-agent-type selection
counts to be uniform, or that each agent would be selected as a teammate approximately
58 times, which is demonstrably false. The chi-squared test for independence supports
this strong relation between agent type and teammate selection with χ2(2, n = 175) =
399.00, p < 0.001.
Treatment #2, Case 1: High proficiency, small differences
In the second treatment, participants selected their Battleship teammate based on prior
experience and objective proficiency data. For this first case, participants were shown
high-proficiency values with small differences between them ( = 5). From the 208
participants collected for this treatment, users again significantly preferred the trustwor-
thy agent over any other agent regardless of proficiency values. Table 3 illustrates these
selections with mean phase-one winnings W̄1, mean proficiencies ρ̄, teammate selection
counts C.
As in the first treatment, one would expect teammate selections to be uniformly dis-
tributed across agent types if proficiency was the dominant factor here, and once again,
this uniformity is not present. Our data and the chi-squared test for independence
instead supports the significant relation between agent type and teammate selection with
χ2(2, n = 208) = 376.20, p < 0.001.
Treatment #2, Case 2: High proficiency, large differences
This case followed a similar setup as the first case of Treatment #2 except with larger
differences in proficiency ( ≈ 12). Surprisingly, the 182 users who participated in
this treatment still preferred the trustworthy agent over the other two agents, even with
the larger differences in proficiency. In fact, even when the most trustworthy agent was
listed as the objectively worst teammate, participants still chose the trustworthy agent the
vast majority of the time (44 times out of 56). For completeness, Table 4 tabulates these
Table 2Mean winnings W̄1 and teammate selection count C without proficiency
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Table 3 Case 2.1 – Mean winnings W̄1, mean proficiency ρ̄ , and selection count C
Agent type W̄1 ρ̄ C
Benevolent 80 85 177
Exploitative 43 85 15
Greedy 37 85 16
Total 208
behaviors. As was the case in the previous treatments, the chi-squared test for indepen-
dence again shows a significant relation between agent type and teammate selection with
χ2(2, n = 182) = 388.08, p < 0.001.
Treatment #2, Cases 3 and 4: Very low proficiency, large differences
These last cases explored whether participants would still choose the agent with which
they developed the most “trust” even if that agent’s proficiency was significantly worse
than the other options. As in the prior cases, participants overwhelmingly selected trust-
worthy agents over the others, seemingly without regard for proficiency. Tables 5 and 6
show tabulated versions of these results.
Overall importance of trust and proficiency
If participants were choosing based only on trust, they would always choose the benevo-
lent agent as their Battleship teammate. If participants choose based on proficiency, they
should always choose the most proficient agent. To understand the interplay, we looked
at how often the benevolent agent was chosen when it was the most proficient player and
not the most proficient player, and how often non-benevolent players were chosen when
they were the most proficient or not the most proficient. Figure 4 shows these rates.
We can see here that the benevolent agent is chosen the vast majority of the time,
regardless of whether it is most proficient or not. This is a strong indicator that trust is
far more important to subjects than the objective information about skill.
There is another interesting data point here. There are cases where subjects chose a
partner who was both non-benevolent and non-proficient. Why would a subject ever
choose a partner she did not trust and who was objectively bad at the game? To find
out, we sent followup questions to subjects in this group asking them why they chose the
partners they did. The responses indicate other “non-rational” factors are at work:
I choose the one guy who returned $0.00 to me every single time. I knew he was out for
himself; having him on my “team” meant having my “worst enemy” in a position where
he wasn’t directly “against” me, and I’d know what he was up to.
-Subject 31
Table 4 Case 2.2 – Mean winnings W̄1, mean proficiency ρ̄ , and selection count C
Agent type W̄1 ρ̄ C
Benevolent 81 79 155
Exploitative 43 79 18
Greedy 38 80 9
Total 182
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Table 5 Case 2.3 – Mean winnings W̄1, mean proficiency ρ̄ , and selection count C
Agent type W̄1 ρ̄ C
Benevolent 81 49 35
Exploitative 43 51 8
Greedy 38 51 4
Total 47
The first thing I did was attack the crap out of my teammate. I knew where his ships
were, and I blew him out of the H2O.
-Subject 54
While Subject 31 may not have thought deeply about his strategy (i.e. having that “worst
enemy” on his team would not prevent him from acting badly, nor did we say that un-
chosen players would be on the opposing team), he clearly had identified this agent as
“bad” and made a conscious choice to partner with it because of that. Subject 54 has a
much clearer intention: revenge. He was willing to give up potential monetary rewards
for the satisfaction of punishing the player who treated him poorly.
Along this same vein, we also compared the relative importance of trust versus pro-
ficiency by analyzing the differences in return (as a proxy for trust) and differences
in proficiency between agents selected for teammates and those remaining. For each
game, we generated four data points: the differences between the selected agent and
the two remaining agents and their negatives. That is, if Agent x was selected as
the teammate, and Agents y and z were remaining, we would generate the points
(x.return−k.return, x.proficiency−k.proficiency) and (k.return−x.return, k.proficiency−
x.proficiency) for k ∈ {y, z}. Each point was labeled based on whether the agent on the left
of the subtraction was the selected teammate. We then fed these labeled points into a lin-
ear support vector machine to determine the relative weights of trust versus proficiency
(shown in Table 7) and characterize the decision plane separating the chosen agents from
the rest. Figure 5 shows this decision plane with green dots indicating points for selected
agents and red for unselected agents. From these results, it is clear that return, as a proxy
for trust, is significantly more influential in deciding teammate selection than proficiency,
even when the trusted teammate’s proficiency is near zero. Another interpretation of
these results is that differences in proficiency only become important factors in teammate
selection when the differences between returns is near zero.
Discussion
To restate, this research had two main objectives: confirm that establishing trust in one
context would transfer to and influence behavior in an unrelated context, and identify to
what extent prior trust could compensate for a poor objective evaluation of that subject.
While intuition and factors like the “Halo Effect” seem to confirm the answer to the first
Table 6 Case 2.4 – Mean winnings W̄1, mean proficiency ρ̄ , and selection count C
Agent type W̄1 ρ̄ C
Benevolent 80 47 48
Exploitative 44 45 6
Greedy 38 46 3
Total 57
Buntain and Golbeck Journal of Trust Management  (2015) 2:6 Page 13 of 16
Fig. 4 Player selection based on agent type and proficiency
question, our statistical results from the first empirical treatment further concretize this
hypothesis. Furthermore, results for the second and third treatments strongly indicate
that human players value prior experiential trust over quantitative information regard-
ing potential teammates. At least for the context of games with small monetary rewards,
trust established in an earlier context clearly influences behavior even when the two
contexts differ, and non-trust-related quantitative information only seems important
when differences in this trust are small.
Limitations and future work
As with many experiments involving human participants, it is difficult and expensive to
get large amounts of data, and many confounding factors might be present. The chief
potential confound present in this work is difficulty separating the two contexts discussed.
That is, Berg’s investment game and the modified Battleship game we employed may not
be significantly different enough for a human participant to truly see them as two separate
contexts. Though the rules are of the two games are quite different, and the teammate in
the Battleship game has much more power to betray the human participant than in the
investment game (e.g., the participant can choose to stop investing money with an agent
but cannot choose to stop being an agent’s teammate), in a fundamental way, both con-
texts are simple, faceless games for money on the Internet. Though the existing literature
supports our claims, the potentially small contextual differences may skew our ability to
quantify the influence of prior trust [7, 17, 18].
It may be possible to address this issue in future work by replacing the Battleship game
with a significantly different approach completely outside the realm of online games.
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Fig. 5 Return vs. proficiency decision plane
One such scenario might be to ask the human participant whether she would be willing
to add one of the agents on a popular social network (e.g., as a friend on Facebook or
follower on Twitter). The social networking context is clearly much different than this
gaming context, but it then becomes difficult to address how onemight integrate objective
information into such an experiment.
Implications
These results have several interesting implications across a number of areas, likely fore-
most of which is the generalization of human preference to follow prior experience over
quantitative information. This preference could be both helpful and harmful; one could
leverage simple trust-based tasks to bootstrap trust in automated systems or collabora-
tion with new partners. At the same time, however, if one has a poor early experience with
a system or other user, even if it was in a different context, this poor experience will likely
affect further use regardless of any informational assurances of improvement.
Recommendation system designers might also benefit from this trust transfer effect
across contexts. For example, if a user A follows the recommendations of another user
B in one context (movie recommendations for example), that implicit trust between
users could be transferred to other recommendation system contexts (e.g., book or
restaurant recommendations). Given our results, there is reason to believe that, if
user A is told user B also recommended some set of books or restaurants, user A is
more likely to follow those recommendations over those of another user C with whom
user A has no experience, even if user A is told user C completely matches user A’s
preferences.
Another surprising result of this work is the robustness of transferred trust to critical
quantitative data. Asmentioned, in the case with large differences in reported proficiency,
the difference between the best and worst values is 91 − 67 = 24, and yet the major-
ity of participants still selected the most trustworthy agent as the teammate even when
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these agents had a very low performance indicators. These results are consistent with
the existing literature regarding people’s ability to dismiss information counter to their
beliefs [5].
In a more abstract sense, these results could indicate the existence of a latent hier-
archy in which trust can transfer horizontally across contexts but not necessarily up
the hierarchy to other classes. While our results demonstrate trust does transfer well
across monetary-game contexts even if the low-level implementations and purposes
of those games vary widely, one might still expect trust established in this game con-
text would not transfer to the context of taking care of one’s children. As such, an
interesting question raised by this work concerns the structure of this hierarchy; what
are the few modalities of trust that are closest to the root of this hierarchy, and
how can we better understand the mechanisms through which trust transfers across
this hierarchy? Integrating existing research from the social sciences may facilitate
this research.
Conclusions
We sought to confirm whether the trust transfer effect is observable across different con-
texts and to what extent this trust transfer can compensate for objective information on
agent performance. Our results demonstrate this trust transfer effect does in fact exist
across disparate contexts and greatly influences participant behavior even when provided
quantitative data contradicts this trust. As listed, this work has implications for sev-
eral different fields and provides a solid foundational step for further exploration of how
humans transfer trust between varying environments and contexts.
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